

Military Operations Other Than War

Introduction

The mission of the United States Armed Forces is to defend the United States and its vital interests. The Armed Forces organize, train, and equip themselves to fight wars. This also gives them the ability to do many other things in support of U.S. interests. These other jobs are called *military operations other than war* (MOOTW). The majority of the day-to-day “real world” missions of the U.S. Air Force are MOOTW. MOOTW aim at deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities, and promoting peace. Air and space power is vital for success in MOOTW. The speed, range, flexibility, lethality, and precision of aerospace power provide a range of options useful in many MOOTW situations. MOOTW may or may not involve the threat or use of force. The number of MOOTW conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces has continued to increase over recent years, even as the size of our forces continued to shrink. The use of our Armed Forces in MOOTW is not a new concept; this type of activity has been a part of the fabric of the military since the birth of this nation.

Study Assignment

Read the information section of this lesson.

Lesson Objective: Know the fundamental characteristics of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

Samples of Behavior:

1. List current characteristics of the world situation facing the United States.
2. Define each principle of MOOTW.
3. List the key planning considerations of MOOTW.
4. State the overall goal of MOOTW.

Information

Definition

MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across a wide range of military operations. The overall goal of MOOTW is to pursue U.S. national policy initiatives and counter potential threats to U.S. national security interests. To understand MOOTW, it is useful to understand how they differ from operations in war.

War. In war the nation uses the military instrument of power to conduct large-scale combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the

United States and its multinational partners. Operations are focused on the destruction of the war making capability of the enemy.

MOOTW. MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace. They are closely coordinated with the other instruments of national power (political, economic, and informational). It is possible both war and MOOTW can simultaneously occur in a theater of operation. It is important to understand that the difference between war and MOOTW is not that war is violent and MOOTW are peaceful. Rather, it is that in war, the military instrument of national power is used for large-scale combat operations. In MOOTW, political objectives dominate at all levels of the operation in planning and execution. In some MOOTW the Department of Defense (DoD) is often in a supporting role to another agency, such as the Department of State (DoS). In certain types of other operations, the DoD is the lead agency, but they will still require interagency coordination and may also involve nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private voluntary organizations (PVOs). These operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) than war.

As in war, the goal in MOOTW is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. The specific goal of MOOTW may be a peaceful settlement of a conflict, assistance rendered to civil authorities, or providing security for a humanitarian assistance operation.

MOOTW is initiated by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and are usually conducted as joint operations (operations involving more than one service, under a single command), and may be multinational (operations involving forces from more than one nation). Finally, although MOOTW are generally conducted outside of the United States, some types, when consistent with existing law, may be conducted within the United States in support of civil authorities. Specifics regarding MOOTW types are discussed in a later section.

Political Objectives

Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out. First, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions, which may have adverse political effects. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions, which have significant political implications. Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious. However, commanders should strive, through continuing mission analysis, to detect subtle changes which over time, may lead to disconnects between political objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes in political objectives early may lead to ineffective or counterproductive military operations.

Strategic Aspects

MOOTW contribute to attainment of national security objectives by supporting deterrence and crisis response options.

One purpose of MOOTW is to deter war. The Armed Forces of the U.S. help deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Deterrence stems from the belief of a potential aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains. Various MOOTW options (such as peace enforcement, strikes and raids, and shows of force) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve to use force when necessary. Other MOOTW (such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping) support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability.

MOOTW also demonstrate U.S. forward presence activities. This lends credibility to our alliances, enhances regional stability, and provides a crisis response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access.

U.S. forces need to be able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort. Crisis response may include, for example, employment of overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single precision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities.

Range of Military Operations

MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities, and promoting peace. These operations provide the NCA with a wide range of possible response options ranging from non-combat operations such as humanitarian assistance to combat operations such as strikes, and raids.

MOOTW involving the use or threat of force occur when conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. The use of force will normally be used only after non-forceful military actions in conjunction with the other instruments of national power (political, economic, and informational) are unable to successfully influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation. Military force demonstrates U.S. resolve and capability to impact the situation.

The use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict and maintain U.S. influence in foreign lands. Although these operations do not normally involve combat, military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to changing situations.

There are also a number of operations where noncombat MOOTW may occur simultaneously with combat MOOTW. In these complex cases, military commanders must have an increased awareness of not only their operation, but also the other simultaneous operations (see figure 1). Both missions increase their chances of success if their efforts are coordinated and integrated when possible.

Range of Military Operations

Military Operations		General US Goal	Representative Examples		
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large Scale Combat Operations		
			Attack	Defend	Blockades
	NONCOMBAT	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement		Counterterrorism
			Support to Counterinsurgency		NEO
	Military Operations Other Than War	Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authority	Show of Force	Raids	Strikes
			Counterdrug	Peacekeeping	
			Nation Assistance	Humanitarian Assistance	
			Antiterrorism	Domestic Support	

Figure 1

Types of MOOTW

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, currently defines 16 illustrative types of MOOTW. That list is reflective of current cumulative experiences, and is not all-inclusive. The MOOTW mission types discussed in Joint Pub 3-07 include:

- **Arms Control Support.** Arms control involves any plan, arrangement, or process in an agreement to limit weapon systems or armed forces.
- **Combating Terrorism.** Combating terrorism includes defensive measures called antiterrorism, and offensive measures called counterterrorism. Antiterrorism helps protect against terrorist acts through training and defensive measures. Counterterrorism includes offensive operations in response to actual or potential terrorist acts.
- **DoD Support to Counterdrug Operations.** This refers to DoD efforts to improve the ability of law enforcement agencies to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

- Domestic Support Operations (DSO). DSO includes support to civil authorities and support to civilian law enforcement agencies. Help given during natural disasters and military assistance for civil disturbances are the most common types of DSO.
- Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations. These operations stop the movement of certain types of cargo into or out of a nation or specific area.
- Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. Freedom of navigation is a right according to international law. These operations confirm U.S. rights to sail ships and fly aircraft in certain international waters and air space.
- Humanitarian Assistance (HA). HA operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters that cause human pain, disease, hunger, or distress. These operations are conducted outside the United States. Domestic support operations are conducted in the United States.
- Nation Assistance. Nation assistance is any help (other than HA) given to a nation by U.S. forces. We coordinate all nation assistance actions with the U.S. Ambassador to that nation. Nation assistance programs may include the following:
 - ◆ Security Assistance. Programs through which the United States provides defense equipment and supplies, military training, and other defense-related services.
 - ◆ Support to Counterinsurgency. The United States may support a foreign nation's efforts to defeat an insurgency. We call all such help Foreign Internal Defense (FID). It includes all political, economic, informational, and military support used to assist a foreign nation in its fight against subversion, insurgency, or lawlessness.
 - ◆ Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA). HCA is only provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises. The operation must fulfill unit-training requirements while incidentally creating humanitarian benefits to the local people.
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). These operations remove noncombatants from danger in a foreign country. Although they are mainly used to evacuate U.S. citizens, NEO may also help citizens from other countries as well. NEO may be opposed or unopposed, but in all cases, U.S. forces conducting NEO prepare for handling possible opposition.
- Peace Operations. Peace operations support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. They include peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
 - ◆ Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). PKO monitor and help carry out agreements ending hostilities (usually a cease fire, or truce). They are conducted with the consent of all major parties to the conflict.

- ◆ Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO). PEO use military force, or the threat of force, to compel compliance with steps to keep or restore peace and order.
- Protection of Shipping. The U.S. Armed Forces have the mission to defend U.S. shipping. When necessary, they provide protection for U.S. flag vessels, U.S. citizens (whether embarked on U.S. or foreign vessels) and their property against unlawful violence in or over international waters.
- Recovery Operations. Recovery operations search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return people or human remains, sensitive equipment, or critical national security items to U.S. control.
- Show of Force Operations. This type of MOOTW uses the physical presence of U.S. forces to show U.S. resolve. A quick show of resolve may defuse a tense situation that otherwise might lead to aggression, or instability. Such operations lend credibility to U.S. promises, and display a readiness to use military force when necessary.
- Strikes and Raids. Strikes are conducted to damage, seize, or destroy an objective. They punish offending nations or groups, or prevent those nations or groups from launching their own offensive operations. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to get information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations.
- Support to Insurgency. An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The insurgents' try to seize power or establish an independent state. The U.S. Government may support an insurgency against a government threatening U.S. interests. U.S. forces may provide logistics and training support to an insurgency, but normally do not conduct supporting combat operations.

Principles of MOOTW

MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes. The principles of war, though principally associated with large-scale combat operations, generally apply to MOOTW, though sometimes in different ways. Political considerations and the nature of many MOOTW require an underpinning of additional principles. The six principles of MOOTW reflect the political nature of these operations and include objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Each is described below in detail.

Objective refers to the necessity of directing every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. In MOOTW the success of the mission depends on the activities of many agencies, military, civilian, governmental and private sector. It is essential that the strategic aims are mutually understood, and that conflicts are resolved. Establishing a clear objective is important, especially when the military is not the lead agency.

Unity of effort (derived from unity of command) refers to the need for ensuring all actions are directed to a common purpose. The numbers of non-military participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective complicates achieving unity of effort. Unity of effort is usually only gained by working for consensus among the players. This entails command attention to establishing thorough communication and coordination through extensive liaison with all parties to the operation. If all members involved in a MOOTW understand the informal and formal command relationships and objectives, then unity of effort is significantly enhanced.

Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The inherent right of self-defense from the unit level to the individual applies in all operations. This protection may be virtually against any person or group hostile to the operation, and must take into account protection against natural crises such as storms and floods. It is critical that commanders understand that MOOTW does not mean lack of physical threat.

Restraint ensures commanders apply appropriate military capability prudently. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. The desired end state may be jeopardized if there is unrestrained use of force. Clear, definitive ROE help ensure restraint is practiced.

Perseverance ensures commanders prepare for measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some MOOTW require years to achieve the desired results. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution.

Legitimacy means sustaining the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions. Legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. This audience may be the U.S. public, foreign nations, the populations in the area of operations, or the participating forces. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives, suiting the action to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. Domestically, legitimacy is strengthened if there are obvious national or humanitarian interests at stake, and if there is assurance that American lives are not being needlessly risked.

In MOOTW, commanders should rely on their knowledge of warfighting and training doctrine, but must understand the demands of MOOTW and be prepared to tailor warfighting skills to meet the MOOTW situation. Forces engaged in noncombat MOOTW should always prepare for transition to combat. Finally, success during MOOTW is founded in professional, skilled, trained, educated, and disciplined Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.

Selected MOOTW Operations

Operation Allied Force

The Kosovo crisis began in early 1998 when large-scale fighting broke out, resulting in the displacement of some 300,000 people. A cease-fire was agreed in October 1998, which enabled refugees to find shelter, averting an impending humanitarian crisis over the winter. A Verification Mission was deployed under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). However, violence continued and the situation worsened significantly in January 1999. A peace conference, held in Paris, broke up on 19 March with the refusal of the Yugoslav delegation to accept a peaceful settlement.

Operation Allied Force was a NATO contingency response aiming at ensuring full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (23 Sep 98). Operation Noble Anvil was the American component of this NATO action to promote regional stability, cooperation and security, in support of the international community. At 1900 hours GMT on 24 March 1999, NATO forces began air operations over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These air strikes against Serbian military targets in the Former Yugoslavia sought to:

1. Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo;
2. Withdrawal from Kosovo of Serbian military, police and para-military forces;
3. Agreement to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
4. Agreement to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and
5. Provide credible assurance of Serbian willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

NATO was prepared to suspend its air strikes once Belgrade unequivocally accepted the above mentioned conditions and demonstrably began to withdraw its forces from Kosovo according to a precise and rapid timetable. This would follow the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution requiring the withdrawal of Serb forces and the demilitarization of Kosovo and encompassing the deployment of an international military force to safeguard the swift return of all refugees and displaced persons as well as the establishment of an international provisional administration of Kosovo.

The multinational force was tasked by NATO to bring a swift end to hostilities committed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against ethnic Albanians in the southern province of Kosovo. The military objective of Operation Allied Force was to degrade and damage the military and security structure that Yugoslav President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) delegated authority for the implementation of Operation Allied Force to the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces

Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), whose headquarters is in Naples, Italy. CINCSOUTH delegated control of the operation to the Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), also based in Naples. Operational conduct of day-to-day missions was delegated to the Commander 5th Allied Tactical Air Force, at Vicenza, Italy.

The Yugoslavs apparently thought that they could wipe out the Kosovar Liberation Army in five to seven days as part of Operation Horseshoe. They thought once they did that, they could negotiate an arrangement for peace. The Serbian leadership apparently also assumed that NATO would never launch air strikes, and that once the air strikes were launched they would be pinpricks lasting a few days. And they assumed that NATO would not remain unified long enough to carry out significant air attacks, which would quickly end due to political divisions within NATO.

Operation plan OPLAN 10601 "Allied Force" covered altogether five phases, which went from the transfer over a possible application outside of and within the air space of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia up to redeployment. The Application instruction (ACTORD) was effective from 13 October 1998, with simultaneous approval and preparatory exercises. The decision by NATO of 27 October 1998 was to maintain the ACTORD with execution dependent on further a NATO council decision. Constrained by the directive that collateral damage was to be avoided as far as possible, the concept of operations envisioned targeting based on a phasewise gradual, situation-adjusted application of NATO air forces, depending upon political and military developments. Operation Allied Force implemented, when ordered by the North Atlantic Council, phased operations which differ according to the attack targets and their geographical location.

- Phase Zero – During Phase 0, released on 20 January 1999 as political signal, air forces of NATO were shifted for the accommodation of practice flight operation to their operational airfields.
- Phase One – Conduct limited air operations, such as air strikes against designated militarily significant targets. Phase 1 began on 24 March 1999 with attacks on the integrated air-defense system (e.g. weapon systems, radar facilities, control devices, airfield/aircraft) in the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
- Phase Two – Since the authorization of this phase on 27 March 1999 attacks extended to the security forces infrastructure military in Kosovo and reinforcement forces (e.g. headquarters, telecommunication installations, material and ammunition depot, systems for production and storage of fuel, barracks). The authorization of this phase took place with the unanimous resolution of the NATO allies.
- Phase Three – The focus of this phase, which was not authorized, was the expansion of the air operations against a broad range of particularly important targets of military importance north of the 44th parallel in the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (24 April 1999 NATO Press Conference). By a month

into the air campaign it became apparent to NATO that a constrained, phased approach was not effective. At the insistence of US leaders, NATO widened the air campaign to produce the strategic effects in Serbia proper. At the April NATO Summit SACEUR was given the flexibility to strike at additional targets, within the existing authority of phase 1 and phase 2 of the operation that were necessary to keep the pressure up, both on the tactical side in Kosovo and on the strategic side elsewhere in Yugoslavia.

- Phase Four -- *[support of stabilization operations?]*
- Phase Five -- *[redeployment operations?]*

The Phase One "Limited Air Response" provided a fast available temporally limited and supported with small strength feasible air operations against military targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - exclusive to the use of precision standoff weapons. Additional operations outside of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were provided for observation and for the air defense of the air space of NATO nations and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as to the protection of SFOR. The selection of target categories with the target of the minimization of collateral damage with at the same time high political and military significance. Operation execution was required within 48 hours after decision of the NATO advice possible. This Operations Concept was approved on 21 August 1998, with application instruction ACTORD from 13 October 1998; the decision NATO advice of 27 October 1998 for maintenance ACTORD with execution dependent on further NATO council decision.

The early goal of Phase One of the campaign was to attempt to force Yugoslavia to the bargaining table. Some countries in NATO argued that it might be possible to do that with a few days or a week of attacks, without demolishing the whole country. Some of the NATO partners were initially prepared to wage only a phased air operation to show NATO's resolve in the hope of achieving an early settlement. The campaign did not begin the way that America normally would apply air power -- massively, striking at strategic centers of gravity that support Milosevic and his oppressive regime. The phased concept of operations of Operation Allied Force did not apply principles of military operations such as surprise and the use of overwhelming force, and this cost time, effort and potentially additional casualties, the net result being that the campaign was undoubtedly prolonged. NATO did not succeed in this initial attempt to coerce Milosevic through air strikes to accept its demands, nor did it succeed in preventing the FRY pursuing a campaign of ethnic separation.

Initial air operations started at an altitude that was estimated to be appropriate for the air defense threat that was expected, which allowed attacks against fixed targets with guided munitions in Kosovo and around Belgrade. Flying at or above 15,000 feet, attack aircraft were flying only at night and were instructed not to make multiple passes or other maneuvers that would entail unnecessary risks. NATO gained air superiority over Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia by degrading Milosevic's integrated air defense system. As Yugoslavia demonstrated that it was completely unmoved and intransigent, the pressure and the tempo of the attacks grew, with the decision at the NATO Summit here on 23 April 1999 to expand the campaign. As the

campaign continued, the target list expanded into so-called sustainment targets -- petroleum, lines of communication, electrical grids, and command and control targets.

Air operations did not attack some strategic targets because of anxiety among NATO's 19 governments that further accidental civilian casualties could erode public support for the operation. On 7 May 1999 NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The planned target was the Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement in Belgrade but the wrong building was attacked. Following NATO's mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy, the alliance stopped hitting targets in the city for nearly two weeks while NATO authorities sought to ensure that another such mistake would not occur.

By mid-May NATO pilots had grown increasingly familiar with Kosovo's terrain and with the tactics of the Serbian Armed Forces on the ground. Pilots increasingly knew where Serbian forces were concentrated, which explained the change in the tactics of Serbian forces. They were operating in smaller and smaller units to make them harder to detect from the air. The downside for the Serbian forces is that this made them increasingly vulnerable to KLA ambushes, and it also made Serb forces less mobile to the benefit of those Kosovars still living within Kosovo.

The fundamental factor in the conclusion of ALLIED FORCE was NATO's unity and resolve. NATO acted in a way that was tough, progressively tougher throughout the campaign. It failed to be deflected from its goals. This lesson was very clear to Milosevic, who had hoped he could outwait NATO. Secondly, both the precision and the persistence of the air campaign were fundamental factors in convincing Milosevic that it was time to end the fight. The air campaign, which started slowly but gathered momentum as it went on, became systematically damaging to his entire military infrastructure, not just the forces in the field in Kosovo, but throughout the entire country. The pounding his forces took during the last week had to have a huge impact on his determination to continue the fight. It had a big impact on the morale of the forces. Desertions were increasing, and there were increasing reports of lack of food, lack of fuel, lack of equipment, lack of will, lack of morale, and increasing dismay with the leadership not only of the forces but of the country, and an increasing feeling that they just saw no way out. And they realized, because of NATO's persistence, the situation was just going to get steadily worse.

On 3 June, President Slobodan Milosevic finally accepted peace terms presented by EU envoy President Martti Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin. With the authorization of the United Nations on 10 June 1999, NATO forces deployed into Kosovo.

Operation Selva Verde

Operation Selva Verde is a cooperative, bilateral operation between DEA's Bogota Country Office and the Colombian National Police (CNP) Anti-Narcotics Unit. The primary purpose of this operation is to locate and destroy clandestine laboratories, airstrips and storage sites. A secondary purpose is to form a strong narcotics intelligence and operational alliance between DEA and the Government of Colombia. The Bogota Country Office assists the CNP in developing and managing

sources of information, as well as debriefings and payments to these individuals. In addition, DEA provides aircraft and the Air Intelligence Group as aerial intelligence platforms to support this program. During 1996, four major HCL laboratory sites were identified and destroyed -- three of the sites were destroyed by the CNP in cooperation with the Bogota Country Office in Operation Selva Verde. The fourth site consisted of an HCL laboratory and a separate stand alone large chemical synthesis complex. This fourth laboratory site was identified and destroyed by the Colombian Army after a site visit by DEA.

Operation Desert Fox

On 16 December 1998, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) military forces launched cruise missile attacks against military targets in Iraq. These strikes were ordered by the President of the United States and were undertaken in response to Iraq's continued failure to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as their interference with United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors. The strikes were designed to deliver a serious blow to Saddam Hussein's capability to manufacture, store, maintain and deliver weapons of mass destruction and his ability to threaten or otherwise intimidate his neighbors.

Operation Northern Watch

This is a U.S. European Command Combined Task Force (CTF) charged with enforcing the United Nations mandated no-fly zone above the 36th parallel in Iraq. The mission also entails monitoring Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security Council directives. The coalition partners of the United States, United Kingdom, and Turkey provide approximately 45 aircraft and more than 1,400 personnel to support Operation Northern Watch. The joint U.S. force of some 1,100 U.S. personnel includes sailors, soldiers and airmen from the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps.

Operation Northern Watch is the successor to Operation Provide Comfort, which officially ended in December 1996. With the closing of the Military Coordination Center in 1996 the Secretary of Defense approved a modification of the mission in Northern Iraq. Since 1991, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT had provided humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and enforcement of the northern no-fly zone.

Operation Southern Watch

United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, passed in April 1991, demanded that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein end the repression of the Iraqi civilian population. Iraqi military bombing and strafing attacks against the Shiite Muslims in Southern Iraq during the remainder of 1991 and during 1992 indicated Hussein chose not to comply with the UN resolution. President George Bush announced 26 August 1992, a decision by a coalition of UN forces to begin surveillance operations in Iraq below the 32nd parallel. The goal was to ensure Iraq's compliance with UNSCR 688. To facilitate the monitoring, the coalition barred all Iraqi fixed and rotary wing aircraft from flying over the surveillance area. With the president's announcement, U.S. Central Command activated Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, a command and control unit for coalition forces monitoring the no-fly zone. The mission was dubbed Operation

Southern Watch. The first Southern Watch sortie was flown 27 August 1992 less than 24 hours after the announcement.

At first, Iraq complied with the no-fly restriction, but Hussein began challenging Southern Watch operations after the U.N.'s decision to retain sanctions against Iraq, 24 November 1992. A U.S. Air Force F-16 on patrol in the no-fly zone 27 December 1992 encountered a MiG-25 Foxbat. When the MiG pilot locked his air-to-air radar on the F-16, the American pilot destroyed the Foxbat with an air-to-air missile. Shortly after the shoot down, Hussein positioned surface-to-air missiles in Southern Iraq below the 32nd parallel. Since these missiles threatened pilots flying Southern Watch missions, the coalition ordered Hussein to move them above the 32nd parallel. Hussein ignored the ultimatum, even after warnings from the UN.

On 6 January 1993, four U.N. allies, the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, agreed to work together in enforcing UNSCR 688. A week later, coalition aircraft destroyed surface to air missile sites and their command and control units in Southern Iraq. In addition to this action, on 17 January coalition naval forces disabled an Iraqi nuclear facility with Tomahawk cruise missiles in support of UNSCR 687, the resolution demanding the destruction of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The following day, the allies launched a successful air raid against Iraqi SAM systems below the 32nd parallel. Three months later, on 18 April 1993, a coalition F-4G aircraft fired a missile into an Iraqi anti-aircraft position after being illuminated by radar from that site. In April 1992, the Iraqi government sponsored an assassination attempt on President Bush during his visit to Kuwait. This plot prompted a unilateral U.S. Tomahawk missile strike 26 June 1993.

Although Iraq challenged the no-fly zone several times in 1992 and 1993, the first nine months of 1994 passed without incident. Due to the relative calm in the Operation SOUTHERN WATCH area, Joint Task Force - South West Asia (JTF-SWA) began a force drawdown in February 1994, with the redeployment of the 49th Fighter Wing and other USCENTAF assets to CONUS from Khamis Mushiat, Saudi Arabia. The operation consisted of a four-phased redeployment of personnel and equipment, and involved the movement in February of 8 F-117's, approximately 300 personnel, and 958 short tons of equipment to home stations in the United States. In March 1994, JTF-SWA continued the drawdown of forces in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH by redeploying 3 F-16, 3 F-15E, and 3 F-15C aircraft from Dhahran, Saudi Arabia to the United States. SOUTHERN WATCH operations continued without incident until October 1994, when Iraq began troop movements south towards Kuwait, prompting U.S. and coalition forces to react with force deployments into theater under Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR.

In October 1994, Hussein, upset about continued UN sanctions, began a series of verbal threats. He insisted on a date upon which the sanctions would end. He deployed a significant number of armored vehicles and mechanized infantry troops to Southern Iraq and to the Kuwaiti border. Coalition forces responded with increased surveillance operations, deployment of additional aircraft and forces to the AOR and a firm resolve to deter Iraqi aggression, and if necessary, defend the Arabian Peninsula from attacking Iraqi forces. The coalition governments, at the same time, said they would not be intimidated into deciding an end-date for the sanctions. Hussein insisted

he had the right to move his troops anywhere he wanted to within his own borders but decided to withdraw them in response to appeals from friendly parties in the Gulf region. Iraqi radio reported that the U.S. had backed down.

Operation Joint Forge

On 20 June 1998 the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina transitioned to a slightly smaller follow-on force. Simultaneously, Operation Joint Guard ended and Operation Joint Forge began. The United States has agreed to provide a force of approximately 6,900 U.S. Service members to help maintain the military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. No timetable for the duration of Operation Joint Forge has been determined. The mission will be assessed periodically and the force size will be adjusted, as circumstances require. No timeline for the duration of Operation Joint Forge has been established.

Operation Shepherd Venture

On 10 June 1998, United States European Command deployed forces to Dakar, Senegal as part of contingency planning in response to the deteriorating situation in Guinea-Bissau. Upon arrival, Joint Task Force Shepherd Venture was formed to enhance the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens in the region. The deployment included command support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other elements. The total force consisted of about 130 personnel. With the final American citizens safely evacuated from the city of Bissau, EUCOM ordered the personnel of JTF Shepherd Venture to redeploy to their home bases on 15 June 1998. Redeployment was completed and the JTF was disestablished on 17 June 1998.

Operation Noble Response

Operation Noble Response delivered more than two million pounds of food to Kenyans who were devastated by unseasonable rains and flooding in the northeastern part of Kenya. The Marine-led JTF Kenya supported ongoing humanitarian relief efforts coordinated by the government of Kenya and the United Nations World Food Program.

Operation Assured Response

In 1996, the US Military assisted in safeguarding and evacuating Americans from Liberia when that nation's civil war re-ignited into factional fighting and general violence in Liberia. During the first week of April 1996, as a result of intense street fighting during the ongoing civil war in Liberia, about 500 people sought refuge on American Embassy grounds and another 20,000 in a nearby American housing area. On April 6, the president approved the US ambassador's request for security, resupply and evacuation support. Between 9 April and 18 June, a US Joint Task Force Operation Assured Response evacuated 2444 peoples (485 Americans and 1959 citizens of other countries). The bulk of forces were from Special Operations Command Europe, and the last elements redeployed 3 August.

Air Force special operations forces led the evacuation effort, Operation Assured Response. Air Force KC-135 tankers and C-130 transports were put on alert in Europe

to support 24-hour operations, while other mobility aircraft began to deliver critical medical supplies, food, water, fuel and communications gear. On April 9, less than 72 hours after the decision to deploy U.S. forces, the first MH-53 helicopter landed in Monrovia to begin the operation. Those evacuated continued on US helicopters through Freetown, Sierra Leone, then on MC-130s to Dakar, Senegal, all under the cover of AC-130 gun ships. Throughout the rest of the week, the evacuation continued, as well as airlift of critical supplies to sustain the effort. By April 14, the evacuation was essentially complete, however, security and sustainment operations continued through Aug. 3. In this operation, Air Force special operations forces safely evacuated over 2,400 civilians representing 68 countries.

USAFE provided three KC-135s from the 100th Air Refueling Wing, two C-130s and an Emergency Medical Treatment Team from the 86th Airlift Wing, and a Flying Ambulance Surgical Team from the 52d Fighter Wing. The tankers, supported by about 100 people, deployed to Dakar, Senegal, 9 April. After flying over 50 missions and providing 1.5 million pounds of fuel to receivers, they returned to Mildenhall on 28 April. The C-130s and 51 people from the 37th Airlift Squadron flew to Dakar 10 April. They helped ferry people from Freetown, Sierra Leone, to Dakar and returned to Germany 19 April. In early April, elements of the Guam (LPH 5) amphibious ready group (ARG) and the 22nd MEU (SOC), were ordered to the vicinity of Monrovia, Liberia. Upon arrival, the 22d MEU (SOC) commanding officer assumed command of Joint Task Force-Assured Response (JTF-AR), which included Air Force, Navy and Marine forces. With additional support from an HC-4 MC-53E helicopter detachment and other Navy-Marine Corps aircraft, embassy security and transportation were provided and 309 noncombatants were evacuated -- including 49 U.S. citizens.

While still conducting this operation, elements of JTF-AR were ordered to Bangui, Central African Republic, to conduct similar operations. A special purpose Marine air-ground task force, embarked on the Ponce (LPD 15) and with 10 days' notice, relieved the Guam task force and assumed the duties of CJTF-AR. This was done to allow the Guam ready group and the 22nd MEU (SOC) to return to the Adriatic Sea and provide the European Command's desired over-the-horizon presence during the Bosnian national elections.

Operation Uphold Democracy

In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Roman Catholic priest, won 67 percent of the vote in a presidential election that international observers deemed largely free and fair. Aristide took office in February 1991, but was overthrown by dissatisfied elements of the army and forced to leave the country in September of the same year. From October 1991 to June 1992, Joseph Nerette, as president, led an unconstitutional de facto regime and governed with a parliamentary majority and the armed forces. In June 1992, he resigned and Parliament approved Marc Bazin as Prime Minister of a de facto government with no replacement named for president. In June 1993, Bazin resigned and the UN imposed an oil and arms embargo, bringing the Haitian military to the negotiating table. President Aristide and Gen. Raoul Cedras, head of the Haitian armed forces, signed the UN-brokered Governors Island Agreement on 3 July 1993, establishing a 10-step process for the restoration of constitutional government and the return of President Aristide by 30 October 1993. The military derailed the process and the UN reimposed economic

sanctions. The political and human rights climate continued to deteriorate as the military and the de facto government sanctioned repression, assassination, torture, and rape in open defiance of the international community's condemnation.

In May 1994, the military selected Supreme Court Justice Emile Jonassaint to be provisional president of its third de facto regime. The UN and the U.S. reacted to this extraconstitutional move by tightening economic sanctions (UN Resolution 917). On 31 July 1994, the U.N. adopted Resolution 940 authorizing member states to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of Haiti's military leadership and restore constitutional rule and Aristide's presidency.

In the weeks that followed, the United States took the lead in forming a multinational force (MNF) to carry out the UN's mandate by means of a military intervention. In Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY U.S. objectives were fostering democratic institutions and reducing the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States. Despite the pledges of a military-backed regime in Haiti to return power to the democratically elected government it had ousted, the regime did not relinquish authority but became increasingly repressive and presided over a deteriorating economy. As the result of deteriorating conditions, tens of thousands of impoverished Haitians fled the country, many attempting to enter the United States.

The United States responded with Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the movement of forces to Haiti to support the return of Haitian democracy. The U.S.-led Multinational Force for Haiti (MNF) began on 19 September 1994 with the approval of the Security Council, which, at the same time, approved the follow-on UN operation. In preparation for this contingency, DoD simultaneously planned for an invasion and for the peaceful entry of forces into Haiti, and executed portions of both scenarios. For the invasion, an airdrop was planned involving 3,900 paratroopers. Most of this force was airborne when Haitian officials agreed to a peaceful transition of government and permissive entry of American forces. With U.S. troops prepared to enter Haiti in a matter of hours, President Clinton dispatched a negotiating team led by former President Jimmy Carter to discuss with the de facto Haitian leadership the terms of their departure. As a result, the MNF deployed peacefully, Cedras and other top military leaders left Haiti, and restoration of the legitimate government began, leading to Aristide's return on 15 October.

Air refueling was used extensively for reconnaissance and combat air patrol missions, with 297 sorties and 1,129 flying hours logged by KC-135 and KC-10 tankers. To transport personnel and materiel from the continental United States to the Caribbean basin, strategic airlift relied on three stage bases close to unload locations: C-5s staged at Dover AFB, Delaware, primarily, and also at Griffiss AFB, New York, while C-141s staged at McGuire AFB, New Jersey. In Haiti, Port-au-Prince was the destination of the strategic airlifters. Airfield conditions at another offload site, Cap Haitian, precluded its use by C-5s and C-141s. C-5s and C-141s delivered troops and cargo to Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, where the personnel and supplies were transloaded to C-130s for movement to Cap Haitian and other Haitian locations.

The credible threat of overwhelming force--combined with skillful, eleventh-hour diplomacy--enabled U.S. forces to land unopposed and avoid the negative

consequences that combat would have brought. The MNF initially employed over 20,000 U.S. military personnel, plus some 2,000 personnel from a dozen other countries. The mission was to restore democracy by removing the de facto military regime, return the previously elected Aristide regime to power, ensure security, assist with the rehabilitation of civil administration, train a police force and judiciary, help prepare for elections, and turn over responsibility to the U.N. a prior but unfulfilled political agreement between the parties on Governor's Island (New York) in 1991 served as a template to shape objectives.

There was a major commitment to peace building by civilian agencies of the U.S. government, particularly USAID, closely coordinated with the U.N. and numerous other international, regional, and non-governmental organizations. U.S. special operations forces played an essential role in establishing security and assuring de facto public administration in rural areas.

The Maritime Administration activated 14 of its Ready Reserve Force vessels, this time to support UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. The ships transported military cargo from various U.S. ports to Port-au-Prince, Haiti. All were fully crewed by a total of more than 400 civilian American seafarers and were operational within four days of being requested, ahead of the military's activation requirement. General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, praised the "flawless, timely response" of everyone involved in activating the RRF ships to support American troops serving in Haiti.

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY succeeded both in restoring the democratically elected government of Haiti and in stemming emigration, thanks to well-executed political, military, diplomatic, and humanitarian activities. On March 31, 1995 the United States transferred the peacekeeping responsibilities to United Nations functions. Advanced planning and coordination for the transition were well managed by the U.S. and the UN, as was the selection and training of senior leaders to sustain continued cooperative international action. In contrast to the Somalia transition, the U.N. deployed an advance headquarters element to Haiti six months prior to the change of command. On 31 March 1995, a smaller U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti (UNMIH) succeeded the powerful MNF, with a March 1996 deadline for completion, after a newly elected President is scheduled to take office.

Operation Restore Hope

Expanded peacekeeping in Somalia began after the failure of UNOSOM I accompanied by the specter of 500,000 Somalis dead from famine by the fall of 1992 and hundreds of thousands more in danger of dying. Clan violence in Somalia interfered with international famine relief efforts, and President Bush sent American troops to protect relief workers in a new operation called Restore Hope. The U.S.-led coalition approved by the Security Council in December 1992 had a mandate of protecting humanitarian operations and creating a secure environment for eventual political reconciliation. At the same time, it had the authority to use all necessary means, including military force.

The U.S. Army, responding to a presidential directive, participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia from 3 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. A joint and multinational operation, Restore Hope--called UNITAF (unified task force)--was a U.S.-led, U.N.-sanctioned operation that included protection of humanitarian assistance and other peace-enforcement operations.

During Operation Restore Hope, USCENTCOM was the unified command. It provided guidance and arranged support and resources for the operational commander. The commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) commanded a JTF/CTF composed of air, naval, Marine, Army, and special operations forces (SOF) components, in addition to the forces provided by countries contributing to the U.S.-led, combined coalition. As the responsible unified command, USCENTCOM performed numerous tasks contributing to the success of Operation Restore Hope. Key areas included shaping a clear, achievable mission statement for the operational commander, shaping an international coalition, and orchestrating the transition to eventual U.N. control.

In 1992, three Ready Reserve Force vessels were activated to support the United Nation's humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Somalia. Although Somalia was a U.S. Central Command responsibility, USAFE provided air-refueling support at Moron Air Base, Spain, and sent contingents of security police, communicators, and postal specialists to Somalia and Kenya. Throughout Operation Restore Hope, MP units were in great demand because of their ability to serve as a force multiplier. Marine force (MARFOR) and ARFOR commanders quickly took advantage of the MP's significant firepower, mobility, and communications and used them effectively as a force multiplier conducting security-related missions as one of their combat forces.

Doctrinal missions included security of main supply routes (MSRs), military and NGO convoys, critical facilities, and very important persons (VIPs); customs; detention of local civilians suspected of felony crimes against US force or Somali citizens; and criminal investigative division (CID) support as the JTF's executive agency for joint investigations. MPs responded to a significant number of hostile acts taken against US forces, NGOs, and civilians by armed bandits and "technicals" and to factional fighting that threatened US forces or relief efforts. They also supported the JTF weapons confiscation policy by conducting recons and gathering information and intelligence (human intelligence [HUMINT]) about the size, location, and capabilities of factions operating throughout the ARFOR and MARFOR AOs. This information included the location of sizeable weapons caches. MPs also had an expanded role in the actual confiscation of weapons by establishing checkpoints and roadblocks along MSRs, within small villages, and within the congested, confined urban environment of Mogadishu. Serving in both a combat and CS role, MPs also participated in a larger, combined arms show-of-force operation (air assault) in the city of Afgooye.

By March 1993, mass starvation had been overcome, and security was much improved. At its peak, almost 30,000 U.S. military personnel participated in the operation, along with 10,000 personnel from twenty-four other states. Despite the absence of political agreement among the rival forces, periodic provocations, and occasional military responses by UNITAF, the coalition retained its impartiality and avoided open combat with Somali factions--blending its coercive powers with political dialogue, psychological operations, and highly visible humanitarian activities.

Operation Restore Hope demonstrated the usefulness of engineers in operations other than war. Somalia's austere landscape and climate posed challenges similar to or greater than the ones encountered during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, including a harsh desert environment, resupply over great distances limited resources, and a devastated infrastructure. The deployed engineer force was a joint and multinational effort, building on the engineer capabilities found with each service component and coalition partner. Engineers provided standard maps and imagery products, detected and cleared hundreds of land mines and pieces of unexploded ordnance built base camps for US and coalition forces, and drilled water wells. They constructed and improved over 2,000 kilometers of roads, built and repaired several Bailey bridges, upgraded and maintained airfields, and participated in local civic action projects that helped open schools, orphanages, hospitals, and local water supplies.

On 4 May 1993 the UN-led operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) assumed responsibility for operations.

Operation Desert Storm

Iraq's army poured across the border into Kuwait on 2 August 1990, and President Bush ordered the deployment of troops and equipment to defend Saudi Arabia. Saddam Hussein's rejection of diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis led to the decision to restore Kuwait's sovereignty by military force. The ensuing air war and the effects of the economic embargo decimated Iraq's military infrastructure, severed communication and supply lines, smashed weapons arsenals, and destroyed morale. Overall, the coalition air campaign accumulated a total of 109,876 sorties over the 43-day war, an average of 2,555 sorties per day. Of these, over 27,000 targeted Scuds, airfields, air defenses, electrical power, biological and chemical weapons, headquarters, intelligence assets, communications, the Iraqi army, and oil refining. One can get some perspective on the scope of the Gulf air war by comparing it to some predecessors.

The Gulf War was not an exercise in massive bombing unparalleled in previous air war history; neither the sortie rates nor the bomb tonnage statistics made it so. The Air Force's tonnage expenditure in the Gulf War was only 11 percent of that expended against Japan (537,000 tons), less than 4 percent of that expended against Nazi Germany (1,613,000 tons), and less than one percent of the tonnage which the Air Force dropped in Southeast Asia. In measures of tonnage dropped per month, the Gulf air war ranked significantly below Vietnam, and was only 85 percent of that in the Second World War.

Yet it was more decisive overall in what it achieved than any of these previous wars. After a 38-day air campaign, the DESERT SABRE ground offensive began with allied forces sweeping through Iraqi defenses. The Iraqi army was crushed after a mere 100 hours. Iraqi troops--tired, hungry and war-weary from 6 months of economic blockade and more than a month of relentless allied bombing--surrendered by the thousands.

Operation El Dorado Canyon

Three carrier task forces of the Sixth Fleet with 225 aircraft assembled off the Libyan coast for maneuvers in March 1986. On 24 March, six SA-5s were launched from the new missile base at Surt against American aircraft. None was hit, however, because the SA-5, with a range of 240 kilometers, could threaten high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra but was relatively ineffective against high-performance jet fighters. Subsequently, the missile site was put out of action by carrier-based A-6 Intruders firing High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), that homed in on the Libyans' radar guidance signals. A second strike followed the next day to knock out a replacement radar unit. Although Soviet technicians were believed to be present to oversee the installation and operation of the SA-5 batteries, none was reported injured in the exchanges.

At the same time, a French-built Combattante-class missile attack craft was destroyed when it approached United States Navy ships protecting the aircraft carriers. The Libyan vessel was hit by two Harpoon missiles launched from an A-7 Corsair aircraft. The most serious loss for the Libyans was one of the eight Soviet supplied Nanuchka-class missile corvettes in an attack by two A-6s shortly after midnight on 26 March. A total of five attacks were carried out on Libyan ships. Ten days later, on 5 April 1986, a bomb exploded in a discotheque in Berlin frequented by United States service personnel. Of the 200 injured, 63 were American soldiers; one soldier and one civilian were killed.

On the late evening of 15 April and early morning of 16 April 1986, under the code name El Dorado Canyon, the United States launched a series of military air strikes against ground targets inside Libya. The timing of the attack was such that while some of the strike aircraft were still in the air, President Reagan was able to address the US public and much of the world. He emphasized that this action was a matter of US self defense against Libya's state-sponsored terrorism. In part, he stated, "Self defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission...a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter."

The use of force was specifically prompted by what the President claimed was "irrefutable proof" that Libya had directed the terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque 9 days earlier which had killed one American and injured 200 others. The impetus for the President's decision to authorize the raid was the American intelligence interception of a message from Gadaffi ordering an attack on Americans "to cause maximum and indiscriminate casualties." Another communications source, an intercepted Libyan message outlined the attack being planned in West Berlin.

The raid was designed to hit directly at the heart of Gaddafi's ability to export terrorism with the belief that such a preemptive strike would provide him "incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior." The final targets of the raid were selected at the National Security Council level "within the circle of the President's advisors." Mission planners decided, as part of the effort to attain tactical surprise, to hit all the selected targets simultaneously. This decision had crucial impact on nearly every aspect of the operation since it meant that the available U.S. Navy resources could not perform the mission unilaterally. The only two types of aircraft in the U.S. inventory

capable of conducting a precision night attack were the Navy's A-6s and the Air Force's F-111s. The Navy had two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean at the time planning for the raid.

The America and The Coral Sea. Each had ten A-6 aircraft, but these were not the total of 32 aircraft estimated as required to successfully hit all five targets with one raid. The closest F-111s were based in the United Kingdom (UK); and use of these UK based aircraft dramatically affected the scope and complexity of the operation.

Planning was even further compounded when the French refused to grant authority to overfly France. This refusal increased the distance of the flight route from Great Britain to Tripoli by about 1300 nautical miles each way, added 6-7 hours of flight time for the pilots and crews, and forced a tremendous amount of additional refueling support from tanker aircraft.

The size of the strike force's final configuration was immense and complex. Approximately 100 aircraft were launched in direct support of the raid. In fact, the total size of the force was criticized as excessive from various sources. All combined, the whole operation involved (to some degree) "more aircraft and combat ships than Britain employed during its entire campaign in the Falklands."

The first aircraft to launch were the 28 tankers from Britain followed closely by the F/EF-111s. Four refuelings and several hours later, these planes rounded the tip of Tunisia and were integrated into the Navy's airborne armada by an Air Force officer aboard a KC-10 tanker which had been modified to function also as an airborne command coordination center.

Although joint in nature, the actual execution of the strike was operationally and geographically divided between the Navy and Air Force. Navy A-6s were assigned the target in the Benghazi area, and the Air Force F-111s hit the other three targets in the vicinity of Tripoli. This division of responsibility was done largely to simplify and deconflict command and control of the operational aspects of the raid. The modified KC-10 tanker was given charge of the Air Force resources while the carrier America controlled the Navy aircraft. The airborne E-2C Hawkeyes provided early warning, air control vectors, and operations.

The actual combat commenced at 0200 (local Libyan time), lasted less than 12 minutes, and dropped 60 tons of munitions. Resistance outside the immediate area of attack was nonexistent, and Libyan air defense aircraft never launched. One F-111 strike aircraft was lost during the strike. The entire armada remained in the vicinity for over an hour trying to account for all aircraft. Although retaliation for the Berlin bombing had been anticipated, Libyan air defenses seemed almost wholly unprepared for the attack. In fact, it was reported that antiaircraft fire had not begun until after the American planes had passed over their targets at Tripoli. It was reported that some Libyan soldiers abandoned their posts in fright and confusion and officers were slow to give orders. Also, Libyans fighters failed to get airborne to challenge the attacking bombers.

Operation Urgent Fury

On 13 March 1979, the New Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (New Jewel) movement ousted Sir Eric Gairy, Grenada's first Prime Minister, in a nearly bloodless coup and established a people's revolutionary government (PRG), headed by Maurice Bishop, who became Prime Minister. His Marxist-Leninist Government established close ties with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other communist-bloc countries. In October 1983, a power struggle within the government resulted in the arrest and subsequent murder of Bishop and several members of his cabinet by elements of the people's revolutionary army.

Following a breakdown in civil order, U.S. forces, in conjunction with contingents of the security forces of several neighboring Caribbean states, invaded the independent state of Grenada on 25 October in response to an appeal from the governor general and to a request for assistance from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. The mission was to oust the People's Revolutionary Government, to protect U.S. citizens and restore the lawful government.

To secure objectives in Grenada and to facilitate operations, the island was operationally split in half. The Marines covered the northern half of the island while Army rangers covered the south. The invasion in the south focused on an unfinished runway at Point Salines. A Navy SEAL team, which was to have provided intelligence on the airfield at Salines, was unable to get ashore. At 0534 the first Rangers began dropping at Salines, and less than two hours elapsed from the first drop until the last unit was on the ground, shortly after seven in the morning. After the rangers had secured the runway, 800 more troops would land, freeing the rangers to press northward where they were to secure the safety of American medical students and bring under control the capital of St. Georges.

At the end of the first day in Grenada, the Rangers had secured the airfield and True Blue Campus at a cost of five dead and six wounded. Once the Rangers had secured the runway, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division landed, and late in the evening of the 26th the 82d Division's 3d Brigade began to deploy across the island. In the north, 400 Marines would land and rescue the small airport at Pearls. Preceding the operations in the north and south, Navy seal teams were airdropped near St. Georges to secure the safety of the Grenadine Governor General who was being held under house arrest by opposing forces in the governor's mansion and to capture the government radio station at St. Georges. The 22d Marine Amphibious Unit was diverted to Grenada while en route to Lebanon. The Marine amphibious unit conducted landings as part of Operation Urgent Fury at Grenada on 25 October and at Carriacou on 1 November. By 3 November, the Marine amphibious unit was reembarked aboard its amphibious shipping and had resumed its passage to Lebanon.

In total, an invasion force of 1,900 U.S. troops, reaching a high of about 5,000 in 5 days, and 300 troops from the assisting neighboring islands encountered about 1,200 Grenadines, 780 Cubans, 49 Soviets, 24 North Koreans, 16 East Germans, 14 Bulgarians, and 3 or 4 Libyans. Within three days all main objectives were accomplished. Five hundred ninety-nine (599) Americans and 80 foreign nationals

were evacuated, and U.S. forces were successful in the eventual reestablishment of a representative form of government in Grenada.

That is not to say, however, that the invasion went without challenge. The first challenge was the lack of good intelligence data. For example, at Point Salines operations bogged down because resistance was much greater than expected. In attempting to rescue the Governor General, American forces were stymied by larger Cuban and Grenadine forces than anticipated. By listening to Cuban radio broadcasts, it seemed that the resistance was being directed from a place called Fort Frederick. As it turned out, but not previously known, Fort Frederick was the nerve center for the Cuban and Grenadine forces and once it was destroyed resistance simply melted away.

The invasion force lacked precise data on the location of the American medical students they were to rescue. One account noted that attack planners did not realize that the American medical students were spread out over three locations. The final challenge to invading forces was the lack of a fully integrated, interoperable communications system. Unlike the fighting elements, which were organized to conduct operations independent of one another, communications systems were not allowed such freedom. Communications was to have been the glue that would tie together the operation of the four independent United States military service elements. Unfortunately, communications support failed in meeting certain aspects of that mission. It cannot be said that communications capability itself was abundant. Several participants cite shortages of communications.

Shortages were not the only communications problems found during the invasion of Grenada; interoperability was another. For example, uncoordinated use of radio frequencies prevented radio communications between Marines in the north and Army Rangers in the south. As such, interservice communication was prevented, except through offshore relay stations, and kept Marine commanders unaware for too long that Rangers were pinned down without adequate armor. In a second incident, it was reported that one member of the invasion force placed a long distance, commercial telephone call to Fort Bragg, NC to obtain C-130 gunship support for his unit which was under fire. His message was relayed via satellite and the gunship responded.

Several factors have been cited as the cause of the communications problems, which were confronted in Grenada. Among them were insufficient planning for the operation, lack of training, inadequate procedures, maldeployment of communications security keying material for the different radio networks, and lack of preparation through exercise realism.

One of the more noted intelligence shortcomings of the operation was the lack of up to date topographical information (maps) on Grenada. When adequate maps were found, they apparently had to be flown to the Grenada task force rather than being sent by electrical transmission.

No journalists were on the island of Grenada to provide live reporting on the invasion, nor had any been taken along with the invading force. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, in charge of the operation, had originally planned to exclude the media

completely from the operation until he was convinced that they could do no harm. As word of the imminent invasion spread, hundreds of journalists moved into the area but were blocked from proceeding to Grenada. Indeed, there were no first-hand reports from Grenada until 2½ days after the operation began. The media, citing the American people's right to know, and frustrated at their inability to provide the current reporting that they would have liked, protested loudly about the military's gross oversight in failure to permit journalists to accompany the operation.

An advisory council, named by the governor general, administered the country until general elections were held in December 1984. The New National Party (NNP), led by Herbert Blaize, won 14 out of 15 seats in free and fair elections and formed a democratic government. Grenada's constitution had been suspended in 1979 by the PRG, but it was restored after the 1984 elections.

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